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ARTICLES
ASSESSING  THE  ROLE  OF  HISTORY  IN  THE
FEDERAL  COURTS  CANON:
A  WORD  OF  CAUTION
Amanda L. Tyler*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most pervasive and important debates in federal courts juris-
prudence is over the role that history should play in interpreting Article III of
the United States Constitution.  To that end, federal courts jurisprudence is
not altogether different from constitutional law jurisprudence more gener-
ally.  But in the federal courts arena—more so than in the broader domain of
constitutional law—originalism has always wielded tremendous influence
over much of the judicial and scholarly thinking.1  It is for this reason that a
distinct conversation about its role in the federal courts canon is appropriate.
The panel giving rise to the following papers tackled this topic from dif-
ferent angles, and enriched the larger debate.  First, on the panel (and else-
where in their writing), Professors Bellia and Clark made the case for the
importance of unearthing the historical backdrop against which the Consti-
tution and early statutes were written as necessary to place the Founding
© 2015 Amanda L. Tyler.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law.  This Essay arises
out of the 2015 panel of the Federal Courts Section at the American Association of Law
Schools Annual Conference, where the participants were joined by Justice Scalia for a lively
debate of these issues.  In appreciation for their helpful discussions and comments, I thank
A.J. Bellia, Bradford Clark, Richard Fallon, Tara Grove, Gerard Magliocca, and David
Shapiro.  Neda Khoshkhoo and James Matthew Rice provided superb research assistance.
1 For example, as Professor Fallon has written, “the originalist and textualist style of
reasoning . . . has characterized nearly all leading academic writings on congressional con-
trol of jurisdiction.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV.
1043, 1047 (2010).
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period in its proper legal context.2  Second, on the panel and in his paper
here, Professor Fallon calls attention to the fact that the historical record that
nearly everyone implicitly recognizes as pertinent (when not in the throes of
a methodological debate) is exceptionally complex and multifaceted.3  Pro-
fessor Fallon’s paper further proposes an interpretive framework for thinking
about these issues that takes us beyond simply fixating on questions of origi-
nal public meaning—which, he contends, is often indeterminate—and
invites attention to a wealth of other historical and functional considera-
tions.4  Finally, Professor Grove’s presentation and paper that follows high-
light that many of the hardest questions of federal courts jurisprudence have
been debated repeatedly in the legislative branch, and she poses important
questions about what to do, if anything, with this political history of the fed-
eral courts.5
There is little question that in the field of federal courts, historical study
has a great deal to contribute to modern debates.  Indeed, historical study
holds enormous potential to illuminate the founding purpose behind consti-
tutional provisions, to unearth contemporary meanings associated with terms
of art that were included in the document, and to uncover important evi-
dence relating to historical practices and context, which in turn can shed
light on the background understandings and assumptions that underlie con-
stitutional text.  Indeed, much of my own scholarship has been work of this
kind, aimed at uncovering the purpose, context, and background under-
standings that informed the adoption of the Suspension Clause.6
2 Professors Bellia and Clark make a compelling case that such analysis is necessary to
tell a comprehensive story of the Alien Tort Statute. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort
Statute, 101 VA. L. REV. 609 (2015); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011).  They have also argued that
such analysis is necessary to a full understanding of those provisions in the Constitution
that relate to war and foreign relations. See ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK,
THE LAW OF NATIONS IN UNITED STATES COURTS (forthcoming 2016); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. &
Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729 (2012).
3 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015).
4 Id. at 1755.
5 Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835
(2015).  For additional work by Professor Grove highlighting many of these debates, see
Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929,
933–38 (2013) (discussing “prior scholarship on Congress’s power over the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction”).
6 See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS GOES TO WAR: TRACING THE STORY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION’S HABEAS PRIVILEGE FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUAN-
TA´NAMO BAY 635 (2016); Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, 103
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Tyler, Habeas Corpus]; Amanda L. Tyler,
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 604–05 (2009) (detailing the  “historical
understanding of suspension” that controlled in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England as well as during key American episodes); Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core
Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 906 (2012) (exploring the “histori-
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But sometimes—if not often—the historical record on important ques-
tions of federal courts jurisprudence is absent, incomplete, or more complex
than jurists and scholars tend to acknowledge.  In keeping with this idea, one
should never forget that certain aspects of the Constitution—including Arti-
cle III and the structural framework within which it is situated—represented
major innovations in their time.  At the Founding, the concept of federal-
ism—and with it the idea of two sets of courts, state and federal—was entirely
new.  Further, the separation of powers framework was, at the least, a trans-
formation of the British model, if not a dramatic departure from it.7  Against
this backdrop, it would be curious indeed if the details of the Article III
power were fully settled from the outset.  More likely, as Madison recognized
early on, there would need to be a “liquidat[ion]” of meaning over time,8 or,
as he phrased the matter some forty years after ratification: “That in a Consti-
tution, so new, and so complicated, there should be occasional difficulties &
differences in the practical expositions of it, can surprize no one.”9
Accordingly, I wish to offer a word of caution about making historical
arguments in federal courts jurisprudence.  Specifically, in undertaking his-
torical inquiry in the field of federal courts, one must be careful about
assigning certain data points from the Founding period determinative
weight, rather than treating them as part of a larger conversation about the
role of the judicial power in our constitutional framework.  This is because in
studying the early years following ratification of the Constitution, one tends
to find both examples of major principles that remained the subject of disa-
greement as well as examples of early legislation and practices that today we
cal evidence that informed the adoption of the Suspension Clause” and inquiring “whether
the Founding generation’s understanding of that clause permitted the government to
detain without formal charges persons enjoying the full protection of domestic law for
criminal or national security purposes in the absence of a valid suspension” (footnotes
omitted)).
7 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (referring to separation
of powers as “a distinctively American political doctrine”); see also John F. Manning, Textu-
alism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–29, 36–56 (2001) (noting many
structural differences between English and American legal traditions).  Of course, Montes-
quieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, first published in 1748 and which promoted the idea of sepa-
rating power to protect individual liberty, heavily influenced the Founding generation.
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“All
new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and
most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.”).
9 Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Letter from James Madison to Spen-
cer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 450 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1908) (“It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms &
phrases necessarily used in such a charter; more especially those which divide legislation
between the General & local Governments; and that it might require a regular course of
practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”).
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would reject as plainly inconsistent with the constitutional separation of pow-
ers.  In support of this point, below I offer a few examples that together call
into doubt the notion that the early Congresses had fully worked through—
and correctly resolved—the many complicated issues affecting the scope of
the federal judicial power.  Although scholars have long recognized the limi-
tations of reliance on history generally in constitutional interpretation, these
examples are offered as a contribution to a key debate in the federal courts
arena.  In particular, by focusing on these contested and, in some cases, ques-
tionable actions of all three branches in the early years of the Republic, I
hope to highlight some of the inherent problems with tackling questions
regarding the delineations of the Article III power through an exclusively
originalist approach.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE FOUNDING PERIOD ON
FEDERAL COURTS JURISPRUDENCE
It has long been a principle of constitutional law that special significance
is assigned to the practices of and statutes enacted by the first Congress, legis-
lating as it was in the shadow of the Constitutional Convention.  As the
Supreme Court posited in 1888, an act “passed by the first Congress assem-
bled under the Constitution, many of whose members had taken part in
framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its
true meaning.”10  The Court has repeated this refrain on many occasions.11
As some scholars have argued, moreover, early congressional debates provide
“important evidence of what thoughtful and responsible public servants close
to the adoption of the Constitution thought it meant.”12
This principle has taken on special meaning in the field of federal
courts.  Take Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,13 defending
the constitutionality of Supreme Court review of state court decisions.  For
Justice Story, it was significant that § 25 of the Act expressly contemplated
such review (albeit only in cases in which asserted federal rights had been
denied by the state courts) and that “the judiciary act was submitted to the
deliberations of the first congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of
great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in fram-
ing, supporting, or opposing that constitution.”14
Drawing on this idea, a good deal of federal courts scholarship and juris-
prudence focuses on the Founding period, and on the first Judiciary Act of
1789 in particular, as enormously important, if not determinative of many
questions at the heart of the federal courts canon.  To take but one example
10 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888).
11 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (“The First Congress . . .
reflected the understanding of the framing generation and included some of the Fram-
ers . . . .”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (same).
12 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,
1789–1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 865 (1994).
13 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
14 Id. at 351.
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in the field, many scholars have pointed to the terms of the 1789 Act as stand-
ing for the proposition that the Constitution does not mandate that a federal
court (whether supreme or inferior) always be available to hear federal ques-
tions, or even constitutional ones.15  Instead, for those who subscribe to this
view, it is significant that the first Judiciary Act of 1789 both failed to vest
general federal question jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts and also
declined to vest appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over the full
range of federal questions coming out of the state courts.16
Just how much weight early practices and statutes should be given by
jurists and scholars is not entirely clear, however.  Based upon a few notable
examples, the next Part suggests that some pause might be in order.
II. WHEN THE HISTORICAL RECORD SUGGESTS A WORK IN PROGRESS
There is no question that what the Founding generation thought “is
surely of interest . . . to anyone trying two hundred years later to figure out
15 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1569 (1990) (relying upon the terms of the first Judiciary Act, and specifically its many
gaps, to question mandatory jurisdiction theories of federal jurisdiction); see also John Har-
rison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1997) (making similar arguments); cf. Julian Velasco, Congressional
Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671,
763 (1997) (positing that the historical records support the conclusion that “Congress pos-
sesses nearly plenary authority to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts”).  Notable
examples of different approaches include Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953)
(recounting the argument of one speaker in his famous Dialogue that “the exceptions [to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court] must not be such as will destroy the essen-
tial role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”); Leonard G. Ratner, Congres-
sional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 184,
201–02 (1960) (contending that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must
enable the Court to execute its essential functions of “maintaining the uniformity and
supremacy of federal law”); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981) (arguing that the history and logic of the Constitution require
that some federal courts preside over constitutional claims).
16 Setting aside a short-lived provision in the famous Midnight Judges Act, see Judiciary
Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, Congress did not provide for general federal question jurisdic-
tion until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2012)).  Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act vested appellate jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court exclusively over state court decisions that denied recognition to asserted
federal rights. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.  Congress did not grant two-way
review to the Supreme Court of federal questions coming out of the state courts until the
Judiciary Act of 1914. See Judiciary Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-224, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.  The
Supreme Court also lacked appellate jurisdiction over the full range of criminal matters
decided in the lower federal courts until 1891. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MAN-
NING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 276–78 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
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what the Constitution means.”17  Accepting this premise, I aim nonetheless
to promote a healthy dose of skepticism as to whether the early Congresses
had either fully agreed upon or entirely worked out every aspect of the fed-
eral judicial power.  To advance the argument, I offer some examples below.
A. Hayburn’s Case
Today we teach Hayburn’s Case18 in the federal courts curriculum as a
defining moment in the early charting of the contours of the judicial power.
The statute at issue in that case, the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792,19 set up a
curious structure—to put it mildly—for injured Revolutionary War veterans
to seek listing on the veteran pensioner rolls.  As the editors of Hart & Wechs-
ler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System describe it:
The courts were to receive evidence of the petitioners’ military service, their
war injuries, their resulting disabilities, and the proportion of their monthly
pay corresponding to those disabilities.  If the court found that a petitioner
qualified for a pension, it was directed to submit the petitioner’s name, as
well as a recommended sum, to the Secretary of War.  The statute directed
the Secretary to place any applicant certified by a circuit court on the pen-
sion list, except that, in cases of suspected “imposition or mistake”, the Sec-
retary was to withhold the suspected petitioner’s name and so report to
Congress [which in turn reviewed the Secretary’s recommendations].20
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, who had of course been a major
player at the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion, filed a motion in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to run
against the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania that would “com-
mand[ ] the said court to proceed” on the petition of William Hayburn, an
applicant for listing on the pension roles.21  Before the Supreme Court
17 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of
Government, 1789–1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 218 (1995).  Indeed, today,
“[v]irtually everyone agrees” that text and original meaning matter in constitutional inter-
pretation.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 881 (1996).
18 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
19 Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (amended 1793).
20 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 80–81.
21 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409.  Notably, Randolph also represented the
plaintiff in Chisholm v. Georgia, in which he argued successfully that a jurisdictional grant in
section 14 of the 1789 Act contemplated suits against unconsenting states over claims
brought by out-of-state parties under the diversity jurisdiction.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793);
see John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1923 (1983) (providing details on the context in which Chisholm
arose).  The modern Supreme Court’s reading of Chisholm, the subject of tremendous
scholarly debate, rejects that decision as at odds with the background presuppositions
against which the Constitution was ratified. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727
(1999) (“[T]he views expressed by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall during the ratifica-
tion debates, and by Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm, reflect the origi-
nal understanding of the Constitution.”).
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resolved the matter, Congress amended the legislation, but not before five
Justices made their views known while riding circuit that the statutory scheme
violated the Constitution’s separation of powers.22
Looking back with the benefit of two hundred-plus years of hindsight,
the assertions of Justices Wilson and Blair that the scheme was “radically
inconsistent with the independence of th[e] judicial power” and of Justice
Iredell that “no decision of any court of the United States can . . . be liable to
a reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature itself” seem to state the
obvious.23  And their reactions to the Invalid Pensions Act scheme make a
modern case like Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., in which Congress attempted
to command the reopening of final judgments, an easy one.24  But the obvi-
ousness of the scheme’s unconstitutionality was lost on the members of Con-
gress who initially drafted and adopted the pensioner system, a substantial
number of whom had also served in the preceding Congress that had
recently passed the 1789 Judiciary Act.
B. The 1792 Calling Forth Act
The Second Congress passed another statutory scheme that today we
would, at the very least, label as curious.  In the 1792 Calling Forth Act, Con-
gress set forth detailed standards and procedures governing when and how
the President could “call forth” state militias to address invasions and insur-
rections.25  The first section of the Act gave the President the power to call
forth such militia “as he may judge necessary to repel [an] invasion” or “suffi-
cient to suppress [an] insurrection.”26  The second section of the Act, how-
ever, required the President to seek certification from a judge before calling
forth the militia in certain circumstances.  Specifically, it provided:
That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execu-
tion thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers
vested in the marshals by this act, the same being notified to the President of
the United States, by an associate justice or the district judge, it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia of such
state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly
executed.27
During the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, President George Washington
invoked his authority under the Act to take measures for “calling forth” the
militia in order “to suppress” the rebellion and he ordered the insurgents to
22 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 84.
23 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411–14 (replicating in the Reporter’s Note the
letters to the President from which these quotes are taken).  Note that the Justices were
joined by sitting district judges in each letter. See id. at 411.
24 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (arguing that the Founding generation rejected the British
“system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers”).
25 1792 Calling Forth Act, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795).
26 Id. § 1.
27 Id. § 2.
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disperse at the risk of being arrested.28  He did so, moreover, after following
the procedures contemplated in section 2 of the Act and submitting the mat-
ter to Associate Justice James Wilson.  President Washington reported in his
proclamation, in which he invoked his authority to call up the militia, that he
had presented the matter to Justice Wilson, who
did, from evidence which had been laid before him, notify to me that in the
counties of Washington and Alleghany, in Pennsylvania, laws of the United
States are opposed and the execution thereof obstructed by combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceed-
ings, or by the powers vested in the Marshal of that District.29
In other words, President Washington sent troops to put down the Whiskey
Rebellion only after receiving certification from a Supreme Court Justice that
the situation was dire enough to warrant such a dramatic response.
The contemporary practices of courts leading up to this period may
offer some explanation for why the Second Congress adopted, and President
Washington worked within, this structure for responding to the violent insur-
rection at hand.30  But it is fair to say that many modern jurists and commen-
tators would label as odd, if not constitutionally suspect, a scheme that
required the President to seek judicial certification before exercising his pow-
ers as commander in chief.31
C. The Correspondence of the Justices
Around the same time, President George Washington, who had served as
President of the Constitutional Convention, also apparently believed that he
could send abstract legal questions to the Supreme Court Justices in order to
obtain their advice on how to navigate various legal constraints in the face of
warring among the European powers.  Specifically, in 1793, through his Sec-
28 Id. § 1.
29 Proclamation of President George Washington, (Aug. 7, 1794), published in Dunlap
and Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser, Aug. 11, 1794 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015); id. at 1425–32 (dis-
cussing Hayburn’s Case and calling into question some modern readings of the case).  For
more details on the 1792 Calling Forth Act and the Whiskey Rebellion, consult Stephen I.
Vladeck, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 159–63 (2004).
31 On a separate note, the episode has the potential to contribute to debates over the
capacity of courts to review questions going to the existence or nonexistence of wartime
conditions.  On this debate, see JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 55 (1993)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has routinely decided ‘foreign affairs’ and ‘national security’ cases
throughout the nation’s history, and more specifically has from the outset decided numer-
ous cases involving the ‘war power,’ [including] the question whether Congress had suffi-
ciently authorized a military action the president was conducting.” (footnotes omitted));
id. at 176 n.46 (citing numerous cases); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 244–47
(detailing the reluctance of modern courts to decide cases involving war powers ques-
tions); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 360 (2006)
(arguing that courts may review a suspension to ensure that the predicate condition of a
rebellion or invasion exists).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 9 10-JUL-15 15:16
2015] a  word  of  caution 1747
retary of State, Thomas Jefferson, Washington sought the advice of the Jus-
tices with respect to a list of twenty-nine multi-part questions.32  The Justices
politely declined to answer the questions on account of their “being judges of
a court in the last resort . . . which afford[s] strong arguments against the
propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions.”33  Today we teach
the episode as settling the canonical rule that the federal judicial power does
not permit issuance of advisory opinions.  But if Washington and Jefferson
sent the questions over with genuine expectation of soliciting advice,34 it
would seem hard to make the argument that the principle was universally
settled at the Founding.35
As Professor Fallon observes in his paper, this example is one of several
from this period suggesting that at least some aspects of the Article III power
were still contested during the early years of the Republic.36  In this regard,
consider also the 1789 Judiciary Act’s provision for circuit riding, which some
at the time argued was unconstitutional, and the repeal of the midnight
judgeships by the Jefferson Administration as one of its first acts, the constitu-
tionality of which remains the subject of some dispute to this day.37
D. Federal Common Law Crimes
Federal common law crimes present a more complicated matter, but
one that provides another example of certain assumptions about the federal
judicial power being unsettled at the Founding.  Congress gave exclusive
jurisdiction to the federal courts over prosecutions for federal crimes in the
1789 Judiciary Act,38 but it then only established a handful of federal crimes
in the Crimes Act of 1790,39 leaving “large gaps in the federal penal code.”40
32 For a summary version of the Correspondence, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16,
at 50–52.
33 Id. at 52.
34 It is conceivable that the President sent the questions based on other motives or
reasons, perhaps including the fact that his cabinet (specifically Jefferson and Hamilton)
disagreed on what the administration’s policy should be during the war.
35 It bears noting, moreover, that Washington and Jefferson may have believed that
solicitation of such advice was appropriate in light of British practice, with which they may
have been familiar, that did not observe strict lines of separation between the political and
judicial roles and countenanced the regular solicitation of advice from judges over wartime
policies.  Indeed, the great jurist and Chief Justice of King’s Bench, Lord Mansfield, was a
regular advisor to the North administration during the Revolutionary War. See James Old-
ham, Murray, William, First Earl of Mansfield (1705–1793), in 39 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 992, 996–97 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds., 2004) (noting
that Mansfield, for example, regularly attended Privy Council meetings during the war);
Tyler, Habeas Corpus, supra note 6 (detailing episodes involving Mansfield during the war).
36 See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1768.
37 See id. at 1773 (discussing circuit riding); id. at 1768 (discussing these examples).
38 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76–79.
39 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
40 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321, 1404 (2001).
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Where the statutory law ended, federal judges initially stepped in to declare
and enforce federal common law crimes.  This practice continued well
through the first decade in the life of the federal courts,41 with many lower
courts concluding, in the words of one such court, that “[t]he federal courts
have common-law jurisdiction of criminal cases, and may punish a crime
though there be no express statute for that purpose.”42  By 1800, moreover,
all but one of the Justices on the Supreme Court had approved of federal
common law crimes while riding circuit.43  The remaining Justice, Samuel
Chase, launched the movement to reject federal common law crimes in 1798
in United States v. Worrall.44  In his view, the courts had transgressed their
carefully prescribed powers in declaring and enforcing such crimes.45
But it was not until United States v. Hudson & Goodwin46 in 1812 and
United States v. Coolidge47 in 1816 that the Supreme Court finally embraced
Justice Chase’s position.  In Hudson & Goodwin, which involved common law
charges of seditious libel, the Court declared that before a federal court can
enforce a federal crime, “[t]he legislative authority of the Union must first
make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that
shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”48  In Coolidge, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this position and largely settled the matter, but only after reversing an
opinion by Justice Story riding circuit that upheld enforcement of a common
law crime in the process.49  To be sure, Hudson & Goodwin may be under-
41 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (2009).
42 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147, 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323); see
United States v. McGill, 26 F. Cas. 1088, 1090 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,676) (concluding
that federal courts have jurisdiction over common law crimes); United States v. Anony-
mous, 1 F. Cas. 1032, 1034 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 475) (instructing jury that indictments
may be sustained by common law or statute); Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn.
1799) (No. 17,708) (upholding conviction of expatriate under common law rule); United
States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714, 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a) (upholding common
law indictment against a foreign consul despite the defendant’s argument that “the matter
charged in the indictment was not a crime by the common law, nor is it made such by any
positive law of the United States”); Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6360) (instructing the jury on the common law crime of breach of neutrality).
43 See 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 299 (William W. Story ed., 1851) (discussing
federal common law crimes and noting that “excepting Judge Chase, every Judge that ever
sat on the Supreme Court Bench, from the adoption of the Constitution until 1804 . . .
held a like opinion”).
44 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766).
45 See id. at 393–94 (“For, the Constitution of the Union, is the source of all the juris-
diction of the national government; so that the departments of the government can never
assume any power, that is not expressly granted by that instrument, nor exercise a power in
any other manner than is there prescribed.”).
46 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
47 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
48 Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34.
49 Justice Story had considered the issue of federal common law crimes “as one open
to be discussed, notwithstanding the decision in U.S. v. Hudson.”  United States v. Coo-
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stood in part as a product of the political atmosphere,50 but it marked an
important departure from an earlier well-accepted practice.
Today the Hudson & Goodwin position rejecting the idea of federal com-
mon law crimes essentially controls, but some subsequent authority does
question its reasoning at its broadest.51  The example reveals two lessons.
First, the separation of powers concerns animating the Hudson & Goodwin
Court were apparently lost on almost every member of the original Supreme
Court and only came to be recognized several decades after the Founding.
Second, notwithstanding Erie v. Tompkins,52 the fact that some enclaves of
“new federal common law” (Judge Friendly’s term53) have been recognized
as appropriate might support lines of reasoning, like those the Supreme
Court relied on in the case of In re Debs, questioning the wholesale rejection
of federal common law crimes.54  In other words, the separation of powers
principle rejecting federal common law crimes took decades to establish and
may even be, to some extent, contestable today.
* * *
Each of these examples suggests that not all of the principles of federal
courts jurisprudence that we take for granted today were necessarily settled at
the Founding.  Take the Correspondence and Hayburn’s Case.55  Both represent
matters on which there was serious disagreement among the branches over
the judicial role, and yet the early members of the Supreme Court came
rather quickly to conclude that what others had unthinkingly taken for
granted harbored serious constitutional problems.  These examples also sug-
gest that even where there was widespread agreement among members of the
Founding generation on a proposition (such as the propriety of common law
crimes or the structure built into the original Calling Forth Act), today we
might view their conclusions as constitutionally suspect.  (This is certainly
lidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), rev’d, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415
(1816).
50 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 234–42 (2005).
51 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).  In the Debs case, the Supreme Court recognized
judicial authority to provide injunctive relief where general federal power exists in the
background, notwithstanding the absence of an express legislative grant of authority:
Is the army the only instrument by which rights of the public can be enforced,
and the peace of the nation preserved?  Grant that any public nuisance may be
forcibly abated, either at the instance of the authorities, or by any individual suf-
fering private damage therefrom.  The existence of this right of forcible abate-
ment is not inconsistent with, nor does it destroy, the right of appeal, in an
orderly way, to the courts for a judicial determination, and an exercise of their
powers, by writ of injunction and otherwise, to accomplish the same result.
Id. at 582.
52 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring that “[t]here is no federal general common law”).
53 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383 (1964).
54 See supra note 51.
55 See supra notes 18–24, 32–37 and accompanying text.
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true with respect to federal common law crimes, at least as a precedential
matter.)  Together, these examples call into question the idea that early legis-
lation and practices relating to the judicial power should be given determina-
tive weight as an indicator of original meaning, rather than viewed as part of
a larger unfolding story by which that power came to be defined in our con-
stitutional framework.  This inescapable conclusion counsels in favor of
widening the lens of analysis to take account of arguments predicated upon
text, structure, and purpose,56 as well as unfolding historical practice57 and
precedent,58 and perhaps normative considerations as well.59  There is
bound to be disagreement over the proper approach, but it is a conversation
that federal courts scholars should be having.60
CONCLUSION
Historical inquiry can—and must—be a part of any debate over the
meaning of Article III and the myriad related questions that arise in the field
of federal courts.  The hard question is what to do with that history, particu-
larly when it fails to paint an entirely consistent picture, paints a picture we
do not like, or fails to paint any picture at all.  My aim here has been to
suggest that some of the debates at the heart of the federal courts canon tend
to forget an important truth about the period surrounding the adoption of
the Constitution on this score.  As historian Jack Rakove has observed, the
Founding period documents are the product of collective decisionmaking
“whose outcomes necessarily reflected a bewildering array of intentions and
56 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004) (promoting the prioritization of text in the Eleventh
Amendment context); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 731, 781–96 (2010) (collecting sources on constitutional textualism and discussing
“purposivist originalism”).
57 See supra text accompanying notes 8–9 (discussing Madison’s theory of liquidation).
58 For scholarship assigning significance to precedent, see, e.g., Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 772 (1988)
(“[W]hen adherence to stare decisis promotes the underlying values of stability and con-
tinuity better than does adherence to the original understanding, the latter cannot pre-
vail.”); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection,
86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008) (promoting adherence to precedent even in some cases where
the judge may disagree with the correctness of precedent).  Even the most prominent
originalist, Justice Scalia, does not discount the constraining function of precedent. See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).  For a
skeptical view of precedent, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence
of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
59 See generally Fallon, supra note 3 (promoting a role for normative considerations in
the interpretive process and collecting sources); see also Jack M. Balkin, Framework Original-
ism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 608–09 (contending that judges
“should be faithful to text and principle and use the various modalities of argument—text,
structure, history, precedent, prudence, and national ethos—to decide the cases before
them”).
60 The papers in this series are, in this regard, a very welcome contribution.
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expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements to disa-
gree.”61  In other words, at least to some extent, we must treat the period as a
work in progress.
61 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 6 (1996).
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